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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper deals with the estimation of structural econometric models where the distribution of endogenous
v a r i a b l e si si m p l i c i t l yd e ﬁned as a solution of a ﬁxed-point problem. This structure appears in Markov discrete
decision processes (Rust, 1994), auction models (Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000), empirical games of
incomplete information (Seim, 2002), and discrete models with social interactions (Brock and Durlauf, 2001).
This paper proposes a recursive pseudo maximum likelihood (PML) procedure for the estimation of this
class of models. There are two main reasons why this method is of interest. First, it avoids the problem of
indeterminacy associated with maximum likelihood estimation of models with multiple equilibria. And second,
the procedure avoids the repeated solution of the ﬁxed point problem. In models where the dimension of the
ﬁxed point is large, this can result in signiﬁcant computational gains relative to maximum likelihood.
2 Econometric model
Let y ∈ Y be a vector of discrete random variables, where Y is a discrete and ﬁnite set, and let P0 be the
true probability distribution of y.2 The structural model is a parametric family of probability distributions
P(θ),w h e r eθ ∈ Θ is a ﬁnite vector of parameters and Θ is a compact set. The model does not provide a
closed form analytical expression for P(θ). Instead, this distribution is implicitly deﬁned as a ﬁxed point of a
mapping in probability space:
P(θ)=Ψ(P(θ),θ) (1)
where Ψ(.|P,θ) is a mapping from =×Θ into =,w h e r e= is the space of probability distributions of y.I n
some models, and for some values of θ,t h eﬁxed point mapping Ψ(.,θ) c a nh a v em o r et h a no n eﬁxed point.
If that is the case the model is incomplete because it does not provide a unique prediction for the probability
distribution of y.
1Tel.: +1-617-353-9583; fax: +1-617-353-4449; E-mail address: vaguirre@bu.edu.
2For notational simplicity we omit exogenous explanatory variables. However, all the results in this paper apply also to the
case in which P0 is a conditional probability distribution {P0(y|x):( y,x) ∈ Y × X}.
1Example (A model of market entry): Consider a retail industry with many independent local markets. N
ﬁrms are the potential entrants in each local market. Let yit be the indicator of the event “ﬁrm i operates in
market t”, deﬁne yt =( y1t,y 2t,...,yNt),a n dl e txt b et h es i z eo fm a r k e tt.P r o ﬁts of ﬁrm i in market t are:
Πit =
(
0 if yit =0






− εit if yit =1 (2)
where εit is private information of ﬁrm i and it is independently distributed over ﬁrms and over markets with
distribution function F. The vector of structural parameters is θ = {θ01,...,θ0N,θ1,θ2}. By the independence
of εit across ﬁrms, the joint probability Pr(yt|xt,θ) can be described in terms of the set of individual entry
probabilities P(xt,θ) ≡ {Pi(xt,θ):i =1 ,2,...,N}. It is possible to show (see Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2003)
that the equilibrium probabilities of entry are implicitly deﬁned as the solution of the system:
Pi(xt,θ)=F ( θ0i + θ1xt − θ2 Hi(P[xt,θ]) ) (3)






conditional on the information of ﬁrm i, and under



















y−i represents the sum over all the possible actions of ﬁrms other than i.I n t h i s e x a m p l e , t h e ﬁxed
point mapping is Ψ(P,xt,θ)={F (θ0i + θ1xt − θ2Hi(P)) : i =1 ,2,...,N}}.
This example has two features that make PML estimation particularly useful. First, in general Ψ(.,xt,θ)
does not have a unique ﬁxed-point. And second, when the number of ﬁrms is relatively large, the evaluation
of Ψ for diﬀerent values of θ and ﬁxed P is much cheaper than the evaluation of Ψ for diﬀerent values of P
and ﬁxed θ. This is because the main computational cost comes from the sum
P
y−i, and this sum should be
recalculated only when we change P but not when we change θ.
3 Pseudo maximum likelihood estimators
The problem is to estimate the vector of structural parameters θ
0 given a random sample {yt : t =1 ,2,...,T}
from the population P0.L e tˆ P0
T = { ˆ P0
T(y):y ∈ Y } be the nonparametric frequency estimator of P0, i.e.,
ˆ P0
T(y)=T−1 PT




T =a r g m a x
θ∈Θ
PT
t=1 lnΨ(yt| ˆ P
K−1
T ,θ) (5)
where the sequence of probability distributions { ˆ PK
T : K ≥ 1} are constructed recursively as:
ˆ PK





The one-stage estimator of θ
0 maximizes the pseudo likelihood
PT
t=1 lnΨ(yt| ˆ P0
T,θ).G i v e nˆ P0
T and ˆ θ
1
T we obtain
a new estimate of P0 by iterating in the ﬁxed-point mapping, i.e., ˆ P1
T = Ψ( ˆ P0
T,ˆ θ
1





t=1 lnΨ(yt| ˆ P1
T,θ),a n ds oo n .
An alternative procedure consists in calculating one-stage PML estimator and then apply one Newton
iteration for the maximization of the likelihood function. There are several reasons why PML iterations may
2be preferred. First, a Newton iteration requires the computation of the Jacobian matrix ∂Ψ/∂P0,a n dt h i s
can be computationally much more expensive than the successive iterations in the PML procedure. Second,
in models with multiple equilibria the gradient of the likelihood function is not well deﬁned, but the gradient
of the pseudo likelihood is always well deﬁned. And third, when the initial frequency estimator of P0 is very
imprecise, the Newton iteration estimator can perform very poorly in ﬁnite samples. Though, one can apply
successive Newton iterations in the likelihood function, this can be computationally very costly.
Example: Let {yt,x t : t =1 ,2,...,T} be a sample of ﬁrms’ entry decisions and market sizes from T independent
local markets. For simplicity, suppose that our measure of market size is discrete. Let ˆ P0
i (x) be the frequency
estimator
µXT




t=1 I{xt = x}
¶
,a n dl e t ˆ P0(x) be the vector { ˆ P0
i (x):i =1 ,2,...,N}.






θ0i + θ1xt − θ2Hi( ˆ P0(xt))
´




θ0i + θ1xt − θ2Hi( ˆ P0(xt))
´i
(7)
When F is the cdf of a standard normal (logistic) random variable, this is just the likelihood of a Probit






0i + ˆ θ
1
1xt − ˆ θ
1
2 Hi( ˆ P0(xt))
´
. Using these probabilities we can construct new values Hi( ˆ P1(xt)),
obtain a two-stage estimator, and so on.
Proposition 1 shows that the PMLEs are consistency and asymptotically normal under standard regularity
conditions, and it provides a recursive expression for the sequence of asymptotic variance matrices. Proposition
2p r e s e n t sas u ﬃcient condition for the asymptotic eﬃciency of these estimators.
PROPOSITION 1: Let {yt : t =1 ,2,...,T} be a random sample of y,a n dl e t ˆ P0
T be the frequency estimator
of P0. Assume that: (a) Ψ is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in P and θ, and for any (y,P,θ) ∈ Y ×=×Θ
the probability Ψ(y|P,θ) is strictly greater than zero; (b) {P(θ):θ ∈ Θ} is a correctly speciﬁed model, i.e.,
there is a value θ
0 ∈ Θ such that P0 = Ψ(P0,θ
0);( c )Θ i sac o m p a c ts e t ;a n d( d )θ





. Under these conditions the PML estimators {ˆ θ
K
T , ˆ PK
T : K ≥ 1} are consistent
and asymptotically normal with asymptotic variances:
Avar( ˆ PK
T )=AK ΩPP A0
K ; Avar(ˆ θ
K
T )=BK ΩPP B0
K
where ΩPP = Avar( ˆ P0
T),a n d{AK : K ≥ 1} and {BK : K ≥ 1} are sequences of deterministic matrices which
can be obtained recursively using the expressions:
AK =( I − Ψθ M)ΨP AK−1 + Ψθ Ma n dB K = M [I − ΨP AK−1]










Proof: By Lemma 24.1 and Property 24.2 in Gourieroux and Monfort (1995), and an induction argument,
the proof of consistency is straightforward. First order conditions of optimality imply that the sequence of
estimators {ˆ θ
K
T , ˆ PK
T : K ≥ 1} c a nb eo b t a i n e du s i n gt h er e c u r s i v ee x p r e s s i o n s
PT





0 and ˆ PK




T ).S i n c eΨ is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, we can apply the stochastic mean value




T ) and (P0,θ




T ), the stochastic





















3where Ωθθ ≡ E(∂2 lnΨ(y|P0,θ
0)/∂θ∂θ


















θ diag{P0}−1( ˆ P0
T − P0);( b )ΩθP = −Ψ0
θ
diag{P0}−1ΨP;a n d( c )Ωθθ = −Ψ0
θ diag{P0}−1Ψθ. Taking into account these expressions and solving (8)















T − P0)+op(1). Finally, by Mann-Wald Theorem, it is straightforward that
√
T( ˆ PK






0) →d N(0,B K ΩPP B0
K),w h e r eΩPP is the asymptotic
variance of ˆ P0
T.
PROPOSITION 2: If the Jacobian matrix ∂Ψ(P0,θ
0)/∂P0 is zero, then all the estimators in the sequence
{ˆ θ
K
T : K ≥ 1} are asymptotically equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE).
Proof: First, notice that applying the implicit function theorem to P(θ
0)=Ψ(P(θ
0),θ

























¢−1.S e c o n d ,
∂Ψ(P0,θ







¢−1, which is the variance of the MLE.
The zero Jacobian condition holds in single-agent dynamic programming models with conditional indepen-
dence of unobservables (see Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2002), but it does not hold in static or dynamic games
of incomplete information. However, even when the one-stage estimator is asymptotically eﬃcient, montecarlo
experiments show that iterating in the PML procedure can provide estimators with signiﬁcantly better ﬁnite
sample properties (see Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2003).
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